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Pornography as a Species of
Second-Order Sexual Behaviour.
A Submission for Law Reform*

R. A. Samek*

1. Preliminary
The immediate subject-matter of law reform is law, and the
immediate reason for reforming the law is dissatisfaction with
the law as it is; but the ultimate subject-matter of law reform is
the human behaviour contained in a social practice, and the
ultimate reason for reforming the law is dissatisfaction with
such behaviour. The immediate task of the law reformer is to
bring about a change in the legal rules; but his ultimate task is
to bring about a change in human behaviour. Hence, law reform
ultimately presupposes a set of evaluative standards according
to which human behaviour can be evaluated. If the human
behaviour leaves nothing to be desired, then the law can be left
alone except perhaps to make it more elegant. If, on the other
hand, dissatisfaction is felt with the human behaviour, the
relevant legal rules must be looked at. Perhaps they can be
changed so as to produce the desired human behaviour; perhaps
nothing can be done, the case being simply one in which human
behaviour will not respond to legal pressure, or the necessary
pressure will be so great as to involve more unsatisfactory
behaviour than it will be able to cure.
Section 11 of the Law Reform Commission Act sets out
the objects of the Commission:
The objects of the Commission are to study and keep
under review on a continuing and systematic basis the
statutes and other laws comprising the laws of Canada
with a view to making recommendations for their
improvement, modernization and reform, including,
without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
(a) the removal of anachronisms and anomalies in
the law;
*R. A. Samek, Professor of Law, Dalhousie University. This paper was
prepared as a submission to the Law Reform Commission of Canada in
response to its Study Paper on Obscenity. I shall refer to the latter simply
as the Study Paper.
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(b) the reflection in and by the law of the
distinctive concepts and institutions of the common
law and civil law legal systems in Canada, and the
reconciliation of differences and discrepancies in the
expression and application of the law arising out of
differences in those concepts and institutions;
(c) the elimination of obsolete laws; and
(d) the development of new approaches to and new
concepts of the law in keeping with and responsive to
the changing needs of modern Canadian society and
of individual members of that society.'
Sub-sections (a) and (c) merely stress the value of tidiness.
Sub-sections (b) and (d) reflect the two somewhat clashing
ideals of liberal democracy: the regard for established tradition,
and the need to keep it in tune with the changing needs of
society and its individual members. Unfortunately, the statement of the former in (b) refers to the existing legal framework
partly with reference to itself. In consequence, the ultimate task
of the law reformer tends to become overshadowed by his
immediate task. Instead of seeing his task as the social one of
evaluating actual human behaviour and bringing about changes
in the social practice in which it is contained, he tends to see it
simply as the legal one of evaluating and reforming the existing
law. Thus, in the area under discussion, the task of the law
reformer tends to appear to him as one of evaluating and
reforming the law of obscenity, and not as one of evaluating
and changing the human behaviour contained in the social
practices of reading certain books and magazines, seeing certain
films, etc.
In short, I submit that law reform has a social as well as a
legal aspect, and that the former should be predominant. The
recognition of the social aspect of law reform is important for
two main reasons: First, it makes us realize that we are
ultimately concerned with evaluating human behaviour according to certain evaluative standards, and changing it through the
instrumentality of the law where this is thought desirable.
Hence, we will focus on the kind of human behaviour that we
want to see continued in a social practice, and the kind that we
do not want to see so continued. We will look at law as a tool
1. R.S.C. 1970 (1st. Supp.), c. 23.
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for bringing about desired social changes, and not as the
subject-matter or object of law reform in its own right.
The recognition of the social aspect of law reform is also
important for another reason. The existing legal framework may
have been misconceived, or it may have become hopelessly
tangled. Consequently, if we conceive our task as simply one of
reforming the law, we may find our efforts stultified by the
mould in which the law has been cast. This may lead us wrongly
to conclude that our choice is limited to either merely tinkering
with the present unsatisfactory legal framework, or renouncing
legal control of the human behaviour in question altogether.
These are precisely the horns of the false dilemma, that threaten
to impale the would-be reformers of the law of obscenity; they
seem to have only the choice of tinkering with an intrinsically
inadequate legal framework, or giving up any hope of legal
control in the area.
If we bear in mind the social aspect of law reform, the
threat of this dilemma is removed. Indeed, a little reflection
should show it up to be false. As long as we know the kind of
human behaviour we want to control, and as long as it is
possible to control it with advantage through a legal framework,
it can be so controlled, even though it cannot be controlled
through the existing legal framework. However, we must have a
clear idea of what we want to control. Indeterminacy of aim is a
standing danger of legal concepts. In a system such as the
common law, concepts grow up organically and are bent by the
prevailing social and doctrinal winds. A concept with strong
roots will adapt itself to these twists and turns at different
stages of its development and emerge stronger than ever. A
concept with weak roots, on the other hand, will become
stunted and die. In such a case it is better to bury the old
concept, and start afresh, though we should salvage from it as
much as we think is useful. Thus, not all that has been done in
the name of obscenity has been in vain.
So far I have dealt with the legal and social aspects of law
reform. The former focuses on the existing legal framework, the
latter on the human behaviour contained in the social practice
which the legal framework purports to control. Of course,
eventually these two aspects must be brought together. The old
concepts must be taken out, or modified, to make room for the
new. This cannot be done through a process of internal reform
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of the law; it must be done through a process of external reform
in response to the needs of the external social situation.
The semantic aspect of law reform is often entangled with
the legal aspect. The task of the law reformer is conceived as
one of defining the essence of the meaning of the legal concepts
under investigation. This metaphysical approach to legal
concepts is just as much doomed to failure as the metaphysical
approach to philosophical concepts. It typically takes the form
of the "What is?" type of question, which leads to a wild goose
chase after the true essence of the concept. "What is (the
essence of) obscenity?" does not lend itself to a true or false
answer any more than the question "What is (the essence of)
time?" Legal concepts do not have one true essence which can
be found, any more than philosophical or any other concepts.
Contrary to the belief of many linguistic philosophers,
ordinary language does not provide a way out. Metaphysical
questions cannot be reduced to ordinary language questions, for
they are by definition not concerned with ordinary language
problems. The question "What is time?" cannot be answered by
cataloguing all the ordinary usages of the concept or word
"time". Similarly, the difficulties of legal concepts, such as the
concept of obscenity, cannot be cured by an appeal to ordinary
language. Ordinary language usage may be a useful guide to
both a philosopher and a lawyer, but it cannot provide them
with answers for the simple reason that they are not looking for
that kind of answer. They have different points of view.
Law reform has a semantic aspect. Law should be
perspicuous, that is, as perspicuous as possible. The task of the
law reformer, however, is not limited to the polishing of legal
concepts so that they display their meaning; and even this
limited task cannot be achieved by polishing legal concepts in
the image of ordinary concepts. The law reformer, as I have
already indicated, should be ultimately concerned with social
problems. It is bad enough if he reduces social problems to
merely legal problems. If he reduces legal problems to ordinary
language problems, all hope of adequate law reform is lost. The
dismemberment of law into an infinite number of legal atoms,
each endowed with its own essence, leads naturally to this kind
of reduction. Law makes use of ordinary language, and the spell
of this language is so strong that lawyers tend to forget that
they use it from a very special point of view. Hence, the quest
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for the essence of legal concepts tends to get confused with the
search for the meaning of ordinary concepts. Thus the spell of
the ordinary language concept of obscenity tends to bind the
most sophisticated lawyer in his search for its legal essence.
Obscenity, it is reasoned, after all is obscenity and not
something else.
This kind of approach leads to the wrong diagnosis of the
problem and therefore to the wrong solution. The law of
obscenity is concerned with human behaviour, with social
practices. If it has failed, it has failed because it did not exert
the desired kind of control. The solution lies in developing a
legal framework that can do the job which we want done and
which the concept of obscenity has failed to do; it does not lie
in extracting the essence of the legal concept of obscenity, and
a fortiori it does not lie in extracting the essence of the ordinary
language concept. Conversely, failure to extract the legal
essence of obscenity does not show that there is no case for
control in this area of human behaviour; it only shows that this
particular means of control has failed. One of the great dangers
of the approach which I have criticized is that it tends to lump
together quite distinct problems under the cloak of essential
homogeneity. The question "Do we want to control
obscenity?" is already misleading. It oversimplifies the problem
by putting a large number of diverse problems into the one
essential basket of obscenity. Yet, clearly, we may think it
desirable to control some alleged instances of obscenity, and
not others. This, of course, has been recognized to some extent.
Nevertheless, a master concept of the essence of obsenity
continues to magnetize the whole area, giving the false
appearance of affording the solution to all the problems by one
simple act of understanding its essence.
Alas, there is no such simple solution. Not only must we
look differently at different areas of human behaviour; we must
look to different means of controlling the human behaviour in
these areas. We must not be in advance fired, or repelled, by an
all embracing concept of obscenity that we must follow through
thick and thin. We may find it useful to bend the concept to
our needs, stipulating that this is obscene, and that not; that
one case requires control through the criminal law, another by
an administrative device, and another still be left to informal
moral sanctions. We may also find, however, that such a model
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concept, bent as it is this way and that, would be more of a
hindrance than a help.
What have I achieved so far? I have not just played with
words. I have submitted that the task of law reform is
something more than a reform of the law, that it is ultimately
concerned with human behaviour which forms the content of a
social practice. Our attitude to such behaviour, and to
controlling it, will depend on our values. The case for reforming
the law in a certain way is always subjective in as much as it can
only be justified according to the speaker's subjective evaluative
standards. No proposal for law reform can be true or false.
Subjectiveness is not the same as arbitrariness. Subjective
standards have to be justified if they are to qualify as rational.
Moreover, the subjectiveness of the evaluative standards applied
in a democratic society cannot be too far ahead of public
opinion, or lag too far behind it. A political balance is
essential. In a pluralistic society such as ours, consensus across
the board, except on absolute fundamentals, is unlikely to be
obtained. The best we can hope for is a compromise, and a
tilting of the compromise this way and that, reflecting the
strength of geographical and group biases. The Commission
rightly set itself the aim of achieving a broad consensus: The
law depends upon a broad consensus to achieve an effective
ordering of social relations in a democratic society. In pursuing
our objectives we envisage the process of law reform as
involving a reciprocal educative function. 2
2. Pornography as a Species of Second-OrderSexual Behaviour
In this submission I shall be, like the Study Paper, mainly
concerned with what is commonly known as pornography. I
shall not, however, follow the predominantly legal approach of
the Study Paper, but attempt to look at the subject in a new
light. For that purpose, I shall first introduce a distinction
between first-order and second-order sexual behaviour, and then
relate this distinction to the concept of undue commercial
exploitation of sex which seems to me to offer the key to the
legal solution of the social evil of pornography. It will be clear
from what I have said already that there is no one true diagnosis
2. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Research Program 1, at p. 6.
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of the problem, and no one true solution. I am not claiming
that my approach is the only way of approaching the problem,
or of solving it. Indeed, the problem is too complex to fit into
any one framework, or to be disposed of by any one solution.
As long as an approach takes us some of the way, we should be
satisfied.
To come now to my distinction between first-order and
second-order sexual behaviour: By first-order sexual behaviour I
mean any overt sexual behaviour, normal or abnormal,
self-directed or other-directed, and any sexual fantasies. Thus,
group sex, bestiality, masturbation, indecent exposure, burlesque, and any fantasies relating to them, are first-order sexual
behaviour. By second-order sexual behaviour I mean any
behaviour that is not itself sexual, but which can reasonably be
supposed to stimulate some form of first-order sexual behaviour. The test is the objective one of the reasonable man,
and not the subjective one of the person engaging in the
second-order sexual behaviour. Such behaviour is not limited to
what is normally known as pornography, for it may take the
form of running theatres, brothels, strip-joints, massage parlours, etc., as well as the presentation of first-order sexual
behaviour in the form of books, magazines, films, videotapes,
slides, records, television and radio. The ordinary language
concept of obscenity usually includes all these kinds of sexual
behaviour as well as first-order sexual behaviour. As I have
already indicated, I will limit myself here to second-order sexual
behaviour that can be described as pornographic. My reason for
this is not primarily the example of the Study Paper, but the
view that socially it is the most objectionable, since it lends
itself easily to mechanical presentation and is therefore ideally
suited to commercial exploitation.
If we think it desirable to control certain first-order sexual
behaviour, then we should also control any second-order sexual
behaviour which can reasonably be supposed to stimulate the
first-order sexual behaviour, unless there are countervailing
reasons that make it undesirable on balance to control the
second-order sexual behaviour. For instance, if we think it
desirable to control homosexual fantasies, then we should also
control any second-order sexual behaviour which can reasonably be supposed to stimulate such fantasies. Similarly, if we
think it desirable to control certain clearly anti-social first-order
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behaviour such as rape, then we should also control any
second-order sexual behaviour which can reasonably be supposed to stimulate rape.
The converse, however, is not true. We may think it desirable to control certain second-order sexual behaviour without
necessarily thinking it desirable to control the first-order sexual
behaviour which it can reasonably be supposed to stimulate.
One reason for this may be that we merely want to take prophylactic measures against certain first-order sexual behaviour
without wanting to interfere with it if it does in fact eventuate.
For instance, we may want to discourage homosexuality without wishing to actually interfere with the behaviour of already
practising homosexuals. Another reason, which is the one I will
sponsor, is that we want to control the commercial exploitation
of sex which manifests itself in second-order sexual behaviour.
The trend of late has been away from the control of
first-order sexual behaviour, except in cases where there is clear
physical harm or coercion, or where a minor is involved; and
even in those still restricted cases the tendency has been
towards greater permissiveness. The prevailing trend is to allow
everyone to do his own thing, provided that it does not
interfere unduly with the freedom of others to do the same, and
this attitude has spilled over to second-order sexual behaviour.
In the past, the reason for the control of second-order sexual
behaviour has been moral condemnation of certain forms of
first-order sexual behaviour - indeed, we may say condemnation of most forms of first-order sexual behaviour. The present
attitude of permissiveness is the antithesis of the previous
attitude of almost total prohibition. The pendulum will no
doubt swing back again. In the present climate of opinion,
however, it is extremely unlikely that the impetus for the
control of second-order sexual behaviour will come from a
stricter attitude to first-order sexual behaviour. On the
contrary, the trend is in the opposite direction. This trend is
reinforced by the failure to demonstrate significant statistical
correlations between specific forms of second-order sexual
behaviour and the commission of sexual offences.
Any tightening of controls of second-order sexual behaviour will have to be justified on separate grounds if it is to be
politically acceptable. Although our attitude to first-order
sexual behaviour is likely to remain a hidden moral factor in our
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attitude to second-order sexual behaviour, the case for
controlling second-order sexual behaviour can, and in the
present political climate must, be made out separately. The case
for such control will be the stronger the more clearly we can
separate it from our attitude to first-order sexual behaviour. It
is those who advocate the wholesale removal of restrictions on
second-order sexual behaviour who point to the prevailing
tolerance of first-order sexual behaviour, and claim that
tolerance of the latter should lead to tolerance of the former.
The more adamant they are in their demand for freedom for
anyone to do his own thing, the louder they protest at
restrictions on second-order sexual behaviour.
3. Undue Commercial Exploitation of Sex
I have already submitted that the concept of undue commercial
exploitation of sex offers the key to the legal solution of the
social evil of pornography, though I have stressed that the
problem is too complex to fit into any one framework, or to be
disposed of by any one solution. For many people
"commercial exploitation" has the clean, metallic ring of
change and progress. Human and material resources cry out to
be exploited, to be turned into money, which can then be
recycled for further exploitation. Nothing can be allowed to
stand in the way of this money-producing force - certainly not
sex. It is a resource like any other, to be manufactured,
packaged and sold for anything the market will bear. Its effect
on other goods, on the consumer, on neighbourhoods, on
culture, are perhaps unfortunate by-products, but inevitable in a
market economy. Matters can only be made worse by
attempting to meddle with these pure economic forces. They
will work themselves out and all will be for the economic best,
which is, of course, the best. The free enterprisers could hardly
have found a more acquiescent attitude on the part of law
reformers than the authors of the Study Paper.
Section 4 of the Study Paper acknowledges that
commercial exploitation has been used as a quasi-economic
justification for the prohibition of obscenity on the ground that
making money out of people's weakness for obscenity is a
particularly detestable activity that ought not to be tolerated.
To disseminate obscene material is bad enough, but to do so for
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profit is worse. Section 160 of the Criminal Code, the Study
Paper states, expressly recognizes the commercial side of
obscenity by authorizing the seizure and forfeiture of obscene
publications kept for sale or distribution; and the compilers of
the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code were so
concerned with the fear of commercial exploitation that they
proposed that persons who promoted the sale of non-obscene
material by advertising it to be obscene, should be punished.
The authors of the Study Paper are not sympathetic to this
approach. According to them, there is no good reason to treat
the case of falsely advertising an article as obscene differently
from false advertising generally, unless money made from sexual
exploitation is thought to be uniquely tainted.
"It is obvious that one function of the dissemination
of sexually explicit material is to make profit for the
producers and distributors. This form of economic
activity also provides paid work for their employees
and for sellers at the end of the distribution line. It
also provides employment for the disseminators'
professional opponents. But in a capitalist society,
such as Canada which has long been exploiting sex
for commercial purposes, it scarcely seems appropriate to make the profit motive a ground for the
censorship of obscenity. It would be anomalous, to
say the least, to permit the sale of some products and
services designed and sold primarily to exploit sexual
interest, but to prohibit commercial capitalization
upon the same interest through the sale of books,
'3
magazines, or films."
It is hard to follow the logic of this argument. Apparently
once we live in a capitalist society, commercial exploitation is
the price we must pay, however widespread and distasteful it
may be. Once exploited, we must continue to allow ourselves to
be exploited and accept the growth both in the range and
intensity of exploitation as part of the free enterprise system. It
seems irrational to the authors of the Study Paper that we
should wish to draw a line at certain forms of exploitation,
though they themselves later come down somewhat reluctantly
on the side of protecting juveniles from exploitation. We can
3. Study Paper, at p. 41.
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almost hear them breathe a sigh of relief that in the "United
States context the Commission on Obscenity found itself
unable to draw any conclusions with respect to the involvement
of organized crime in the distribution of obscene material." 4
The fact that the Commission did note a considerable arrest
record for those selling sexually explicit material is put down to
the fault of the obscenity laws rather than to the kind of people
willing to engage in the commercial exploitation of sex. If
criminal restrictions were removed, legitimate businessmen
could move in and commercial exploitation of sex would
become indistinguishable from any other form of commercial
exploitation.
We do not have to go along with the sweeping claims of
Freud to recognize that sex is an all pervading human drive.
Hence, its attraction for the exploiters. Once the vast and
hitherto virtually untapped resources of sex can be harnessed,
there is no knowing what magnificent profits might be reaped.
The words "Open sesame" have long been known to have a
special sexual significence. It is not surprising that we have seen
a staggering growth in sex products and in the dividends flowing
from them. Bookstores, theatres, cinemas, whole streets and
neighbourhoods have received this new commercial infusion,
driving out the old fashioned forms of literature, art and
architecture. Notwithstanding the incontrovertible evidence of
our senses, and the world-wide nature of the phenomenon, the
impact of the sex industry tends to be played down. After all, it
is argued, we have always had sex, prostitution and graffiti and
the quality of life generally has not suffered. To argue in this
way is like comparing the ravages of the motor car to the evils
of the horse and buggy days, and the modern pollution menace
to the danger of toxic smoke belched from the inefficient
chimneys of the industrial revolution. The size of the operation,
the range of injurious consequences and the defencelessness of
the victims in the exploited jungles of urbanization are
conveniently discounted.
It is interesting to observe that while economic laissez faire
has steadily diminished, and the need for government control
has been recognized in an ever widening number of spheres, the
4. Ibid. The Commission referred to is The Commission on Obscenity
and Pornographywhich reported in 1970.
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reverse has been true in the area of commercial exploitation of
sex. Under the libertarian banner of the freedom of the
individual, his appetite for sex has been utilized to open up a
new market for exploitation. It followed logically on the
exploitation of man's other basic wants - food, drink, clothing
and shelter. Sex itself had of course not remained untouched.
There would have been no cinema industry without the
commercial exploitation of the sex symbols of the twenties. But
sex then had still retained a human face, in spite of, or perhaps
because of its romantic make-up. It had not yet been exploited
to the point of stripping it down to its cold entrails.
When sex is dehumanized and frozen into a commercial
product, perversion is never far away. The potential of natural
sex is alas limited. So it must be expanded to afford a wider
range of consumer goods. The banner used again is that of
individual liberty. The very words "natural" and "perversion"
are discredited. Anything goes, provided it is not "harmful" to
anybody else, and nothing is considered harmful unless it is
physically harmful. This is completely in line with economic
laissez faire. The market will take care of everything except the
bare protection of human beings from physical harm, and even
that might have to be accepted in some cases as an inevitable
by-product of the market system.
If we look at the banner and at the reality, we find a very
marked contrast. In the name of the liberty of the individual,
the individual has become dehumanized and has lost his
individuality. Sex has been added to the long list of items that
he is stimulated to consume not for its own enjoyment, but to
serve the commercial goals of a whole new industry. First-order
sexual behaviour had been successfully exploited for ages.
However, to the new captains of industry its limitations were
painfully obvious. Prostitution could never yield a mass market.
It retained an ineradicable human element. Second-order sexual
behaviour was a very different proposition. It was ideally suited
both to mass production and to mass consumption. All that was
required was to make it respectable, and the times were
propitious. The decline in religion, the advent of efficient birth
control, the harsh treatment of homosexuals, the ill-advised
prosecutions of genuine works of art and literature on the
ground of obscenity, had created a reaction in favour of greater
sexual and artistic freedom. Reformers of all hues were pushing
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this cause, aided by revolutionaries who were determined to gut
the phony bourgeois morals. Excesses were encouraged pour
pater les bourgeois. The bandwagon was ready to roll, and roll
it did under the glorious banner of the liberty of the individual.
In time, however, the meaning of the inscription on the banner
changed. It ceased to be a call for the cultural freedom of the
individual, and became instead a consumer right, a right to
consume a product which he had been stimulated to demand.
The liberty of the individual now meant the right to have his
demands as a consumer satisfied, whatever they might be,
provided only they were not harmful to anybody else. In this
way Mill's grand idea of positive liberty,' which was to produce
a sort of rational superman through his own unfettered
endeavours, became deflated to the liberty of the consumer, the
little man who is entitled to consume his "chosen" brand of
pornography just as he is entitled to consume his "chosen"
brand of groceries and liquor, and his "chosen" brand of soft
drugs.
The producers who cater to the "needs" of the consumer
are not concerned to satisfy his instinctive wants. These are
far too limited, too chaotic, and too unprofitable. The object of
advertising is to "educate" consumers, to create consumer needs
and rights that can satisfy the market, and not just the
consumer. In this way, man's crude appetite for food is raised
to a consumer need for the processed, packaged, canned and
frozen products of the food industry. Similarly, man's primitive
sexual drives are diverted into more sophisticated and profitable
channels. The producers of pornography are not more
concerned than the producers of processed food to satisfy their
consumers' instinctive wants. On the contrary, natural sex and
pornography are as far removed from each other as natural food
and the processor's glossy product. Plastic can never replace
food, and pornography can never replace sex; but food can be
made more like plastic, and sex more like pornography. The evil
of undue commercial exploitation lies not only in its generation
of unnecessary production and consumption, and in the
consequent waste of economic resources; it lies above all in
turning man into a consumer. Whatever freedom and security
5. See R. A. Samek, The Enforcement of Morals (1971), 49 Can. Bar
Rev. 188, at pp. 195-196.
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have been gained by the mechanization of primitive methods of
production and distribution, have been lost by the mechanization
and multiplication of human wants. Through the media, the
consumer is plugged into the market place, and his whole life is
governed by it. Sex has been one of the last bulwarks of natural
man. Now even that is becoming a consumer product.
Second-order is taking over from first-order sexual behaviour,
and the latter is conceived increasingly in the image of the
former. It is not sex, or any of his other wants, that dominates
man. What dominates him is the commercial exploitation of
these wants, and his own debasement to the role of a consumer.
The authors of the Study Paper accurately point out the
cure for commercial exploitation. It is, they say, "also argued in
support of the commercial exploitation rationale that if
production and circulation of obscene material for gain could
be eliminated the supply would be cut off its source." 6
However, they reject this suggestion on the ground that in a
capitalist society such as Canada it is inappropriate to make the
profit motive a ground for the censorship of obscenity. I have
already submitted that even in such a society commercial
exploitation should have certain limits. It is one thing to say
that as a matter of political realism we can only strike at the
extreme manifestations of commercial exploitation, and quite
another thing to debate the merits of permissiveness in regard to
second-order sexual behaviour as if it were a separate issue
unconnected with commercial exploitation. If we accept
commercial exploitation of every kind, whether we do so
happily or reluctantly, we no longer have a case for controlling
second-order sexual behaviour as such. We will then have to
make out a case for controlling first-order sexual behaviour, and
for extending its control to second-order sexual behaviour.
Given the prevalent permissiveness in regard to first-order sexual
behaviour, we will almost certainly fail in this task. The best we
can hope for will be to continue to control the first and
second-order sexual behaviour of juveniles. This is in fact the
conclusion reached both in the Study Paper and in the report of
the United States Commission on Obscenity and Pornograpby.
The thrust of my own submission is that we should strike
at undue commercial exploitation of second-order, without
6. Study Paper, at p. 40.
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basing our case on the control of first-order sexual behaviour. I
do not thereby wish to suggest that there should be no control
at all over such behaviour, or that our present legal controls are
adequate or well directed. I think that the removal of criminal
sanctions from homosexual conduct between consenting adults
was completely justified. But it would be wrong to deduce from
this that all forms of sexual conduct should be treated as
equivalent and left entirely to individual discretion. The old
fashioned view that sex is connected with morals, and that
morals are something more than private likes and dislikes, has
solid roots. Unfortunately, they were exhausted in the rank
growth of dogmatic prohibitions and needlessly intolerant
attitudes which brought this view into disrepute. The pendulum
now has swung to the opposite extreme. While previously the
earthy aspect of sex had been hidden, the modern tendency has
been to deny its spiritual and specifically human aspects. The
commercial exploitation of sex has spilled over from secondorder to first-order sexual behaviour, and has begun to
mechanize and dehumanize the latter. The sexual partner, if
any, has become a mere tool for the achievement of auto-erotic
fantasies.
Although the control of second-order sexual behaviour will
have certain effects on first-order sexual behaviour, my case for
controlling the former is not based on its effect on the latter.
This is simply a significant added benefit of controlling undue
commercial exploitation. People with very different attitudes to
first-order sexual behaviour may agree to control second-order
sexual behaviour on the ground of undue commercial exploitation. Indeed, one would have thought that the New Left would
come out firmly in favour of such control. If they have not
done so, the reason presumably lies in their fear of censorship
of political as well as of sexual ideas, and in their reluctance to
line up with a conservative pro-censorship lobby that seeks to
put the clock back rather than forward. The anti-pornogrpahy
lobby has all to often played into the hands of the
pornographers by basing their crusades on fundamentalist mores
that are no longer accepted either in the sphere of first-order
sexual behaviour or in any other.
The exploitation of women as sex objects should, I submit,
be treated as a special case of undue commercial exploitation of
sex. The economically and socially inferior position of women
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has made them an ideal object of commercial exploitation in
many industries, and has also helped to swell the ranks of the
oldest profession in the world. Insofar as the commercial
exploitation of sex is largely one of the exploitation of the
female sex, the Women's Lib. movement rightly plays an active
part in opposing it on this ground. Homosexual organizations
should feel equally strongly about the exploitation of men for
purely commercial ends. What is objectionable in my view is not
that any particular group be singled out, but that undue
commercial exploitation of sex should be allowed at all.
Pornography is not only degrading to the subject; it is also
degrading to the object, the consumer. In other words, it is not
only the subject that is turned into a sex object; the consumer,
as the target of the commercial exploitation, is turned into a sex
object as well.
The exploitation of juveniles should also, I submit, be
treated as a special case of undue commercial exploitation of
sex. Since they tend to be sexually more naive, excitable and
unstable, it is particularly important to control second-order
sexual behaviour that is aimed at them, or to which they are
exposed. The guiding rationale of this view is to protect them
from undue sexual exploitation, not to protect their morals by
shielding them from the temptation to engage in related forms
of first-order sexual behaviour. It should be noted that this
rationale differs from that reluctantly endorsed by the Study
Paper. After asserting that the justification for legislation aimed
specifically for withholding obscenity from juveniles cannot be
found in scientifically established facts as to the effect of
obscenity on juveniles, the authors of the Study Paper spell out
their rationale as follows:
"It rests upon the view that protection of youngsters
from risk of distorted sexual learning, moral danger
and the potentiality of delinquency (even though the
risk is extremely remote) is a value of greater
significance than unregulated freedom of expression
and that, provided adults are not restricted in their
access to this material, the interference with freedom
of expression is in any event not substantial." 7

7. Ibid., at p. 112
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The approach to pornography in terms of undue commercial exploitation of sex has as its corollary the freeing from
control of non-commercial second-order sexual behaviour that
is now controlled on the ground of obscenity or pornography.
This applies to the second-order sexual behaviour of juveniles as
well as of adults; but it does not mean that such behaviour may
not be controlled on other grounds. Thus juveniles will continue
to be protected under child welfare and juvenile delinquency
legislation.
4. Criteriaand Metbods of Control
One of the standard arguments against controlling obscenity
and pornography is the difficulty of defining these concepts. I
have already indicated that this difficulty is not inherent in the
subject-matter, but is the result of the approach that has been
taken. The fact that the essence of obscenity and pornography
has continued to elude us does not mean that we cannot shed
light in this area because it is eo ipso one of total darkness. I
have proposed that we shed this light by means of distinguishing
between first-order and second-order sexual behaviour, and by
relating this distinction to the concept of undue commercial
exploitation of sex. By framing our inquiry in this way we not
only sidestep the historical difficulties of defining obscenity and
pornography; we also make it possible to evaluate second-order
independently of first-order sexual behaviour, and thus avoid
the dilemma of being either a hardliner on sex and pornography, or a liberal on both counts. If we look at the old
problems of pornography in this light, we will no longer be
terrified by the spectre of a situation that we cannot control. It
would be truly extraordinary if, in a control-ridden society such
as ours, no effective and acceptable means of controlling certain
forms of second-order sexual behaviour could be found,
assuming that we think it desirable to do so. We should not,
however, look to the criminal law as the appropriate instrumentality. The choice of criminal law rests on its concern with
sexual morality; its concern with second-order is rooted in its
concern with first-order sexual behaviour. I do not subscribe to
the positivist view that law is law and morals are morals, and
never the twain shall meet. However, moral attitudes may
change, and this may involve a breakdown in a legal system that
attempts to enforce outdated attitudes. A standard argument
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against controlling pornography is that since there is no general
support for the kind of morality that condemns it, we cannot,
even it we wanted to, enforce such control. This may be true, if
we try to control it through the criminal law on moral grounds.
But if, as I submit, we seek to prevent undue exploitation of sex
by striking at its roots by administrative means, the control of
pornography is in principle in tune with the temper of the
times.
It might be argued against me that so far I have been
avoiding the real difficulties. To speak of undue commercial
exploitation, it might be said, begs the very question in issue,
namely what constitutes such exploitation; and that if I were to
attempt to answer it, I would run into the same sort of
difficulties which I tried to avoid by abandoning the method of
definition. I submit that this argument does not hold. The
problem of spelling out certain second-order sexual behaviour
that is postulated as unacceptable on the ground of undue
commercial exploitation of sex is a very different problem from
that of defining the true essence of pornography. Unlike the
latter, the former is inherently soluble.
There are two elements involved in undue commercial
exploitation of sex: the element of commercial exploitation and
that of sex. Mere commercial exploitation is not enough, nor is
uncommercial second-order sexual behaviour. There must be a
combination of both elements, and the total must be undue.
While some measure of exploitation of sex is permissible and
inevitable in a capitalist society, the exploitation becomes
undue when it exceeds certain boundaries. In order to trace
these boundaries, we must lay down evaluative standards of
what is to count as undue. There is no inherent difficulty in
doing this as long as we know what forms of second-order
sexual behaviour we want to control. Many of the difficulties of
the past are the result of the indeterminacy of aim which has
shrouded the vague concept of pornography.
What we need then is a model that tells us what forms of
second-order sexual behaviour should be controlled on the
ground that they amount to an undue commercial exploitation
of sex. The relevant evaluative standards are those which we
postulate, and not those of the alleged exploiter. An intention
to exploit sex is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of
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undue commercial exploitation. On the other hand, undue
commercial exploitation of sex is only possible if it can
reasonably be supposed that this was the intention of the
exploiter. The test, as in the case of determining whether
certain forms of second-order sexual behaviour stimulate some
forms of first order sexual behaviour, is the ojective one of the
reasonable man, and not the subjective one of the exploiter.
Commercial exploitation of sex is only possible if the
second-order sexual behaviour can reasonably be supposed to
stimulate some form of first-order sexual behaviour for the
purpose of commercial exploitation.
Although, obviously, a model such as I have proposed will
have to be descriptive of the second-order sexual behaviour that
is to be controlled, it cannot be divorced from the guiding
concept of undue commercial exploitation of sex. For instance,
the explicitness of the second-order sexual behaviour cannot by
itself be a sufficient reason for controlling it. This is so because
the reason for the explicitness may have nothing to do with
commercial exploitation. The reason for it may be perfectly
legitimate, as in the case where it is required for the purpose of
art, medicine or education. Conversely, second-order sexual
behaviour that is only suggestive may, nevertheless, be
considered to amount to undue commercial exploitation if, for
instance, it consists in the production of unpleasantly titillating
material on a large scale. The class of undesirable second-order
sexual behaviour cannot be frozen. Not only are not all
instances of such behaviour necessarily foreseeable, their social
consequences may vary in time, and the law must remain
sufficiently flexible to block the ingenuity of lawyers in
avoiding existing road blocks.
It may now be objected that it is precisely this irreducible
value element, which cannot be eliminated by any mere
description of second-order sexual behaviour, that creates
insuperable difficulties. Thus, it will be said, what is unduly
suggestive to one person may not be so to another, and one
man's art is another man's pornography. This is all very true,
but it only underlines that legal determinations require the
application of evaluative standards. The need for their
application is a characteristic of the normative nature of legal
determinations generally and in no way peculiar to pornography.
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I have said that what we need is a model of the forms of
second-order sexual behaviour that we want to control because
we consider them to amount to an undue exploitation of sex,
and that such a model cannot be divorced from the rationale of
the guiding concept of commercial exploitation. All the same,
the description of the second-order sexual behaviour that is to
be controlled will obviously be of the greatest importance. Such
description requires that we lay down certain criteria of
classification for describing the various categories of secondorder sexual behaviour which we want to control. These
criteria, however, cannot be postulated without regard to
existing commercial practices, for their object is not to create
an ideal set of standards, but to control certain forms of
existing or anticipated commercial exploitation. If we are to
beat the "pulp" industry, we must beat it at its own game, and
to do so we must have adequate knowledge of how it operates,
what its standards and techniques are, and we must have a
record of the profitability of its various operations. This
empirical homework must be done here; we cannot rely on
studies done in the United States or elsewhere, though they will
provide us with an initial framework to set up our own
investigations.
An empirical study of the commercial exploitation of sex
will be revealing both in regard to its sexual and in regard to its
commercial element. It will tell us how the trade distinguishes
between various grades of "hard" and "soft" pornography, and
also where they are to be found and how profitable they are.
The motivational force of all forms of second-order sexual
behaviour is their stimulation of first-order sexual behaviour,
which I have stipulated to include sexual fantasies. For this
reason, I have defined second-order sexual behaviour as any
behaviour that is not itself sexual, but which can reasonably be
supposed to stimulate some form of first-order sexual behaviour. The degree of sexual stimulation of the second-order
sexual behaviour does not necessarily vary directly with its
degree of explicitness, since the law of diminishing returns will
begin to operate and the "hardness" of the pornography will
become self-defeating. Nevertheless, the greater the explicitness
of the second-order sexual behaviour, the more reluctant will
we be on ideological (including moral) grounds to allow its
commercial exploitation.
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Obviously, as long as our rationale for controlling certain
forms of second-order sexual behaviour is the prevention of
undue commercial exploitation, its sexual element alone cannot
be a sufficient reason for its control. Thus, the stimulating
effect of erotic art is not sufficient to amount to commercial
exploitation of sex. Consequently, we escape the trap of
classifying something as pornographic and recognizing at the
same time that it has some remedial social quality, such as being
a work of art. There is something very unfortunate, to say the
least, in the notion of good pornography.
Switching now to the commercial element of the
exploitation of sex, we may say that it denotes a quantity,
while the sexual element denotes a quality; and that the
quantity of our tolerance of such exploitation should vary in
inverse proportion to the obnoxious quality of the pornography. By quantity, I mean a combination of the quantity of
goods sold, the quantity of the consumers, and the quantity of
the profits earned, depending on the kind of commercial
operation that we are concerned with. For instance, a television
programme that is performed only once may still be unacceptable if its quality is such that it should not be commercially
exploited by beaming it to a large number of viewers, even if we
could be sure that no juveniles would be watching it. Moreover,
there is here the added factor of exploiting the consumer in his
own home. It is no defence to plead that he is a volunteer, that
he need not turn on his set unless he wishes to. The plain fact is
that he has lost the capacity of being a true volunteer; he has
become a perfect consumer, willing to consume what he has
been conditioned to consume. Not everyone, of course, is a
perfect consumer. There can be little doubt, however, that if
free reign were given to the commercial exploitation of sex on
television, its captive market would be greatly increased.
We will be more tolerant of the medium of radio, since it
lacks the visual appeal of television, though the advent of
"topless" radio has opened a surprising commercial potential.
Films shown commercially are in an intermediate class. They
have the visual appeal of television and a greater commercial
potential insofar as they can be shown for long periods of time.
On the other hand, their audience cannot match that of
television, and they present less of a temptation because they
are not brought into the home. The consumer has to seek out
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his pornographic film instead of being virtually exposed to it,
and protection of juveniles is a good deal easier. For these
reasons no doubt television is much more strictly controlled
than films. Pictorial material in the form of slides, magazines
and "art" books lack the life-like character of films, but they
are generally easier and cheaper to mass-produce. Purely literary
material has a weaker appeal than pictorial material. On the
other hand, it is cheaper to produce, and the entrepreneurs
specializing in it tend to support their market by exploiting to
the full its potential for violence and perversion.
Once we are agreed on the desirability of destroying the
profitability of undue commercial exploitation of sex, the
question of what are the best methods of achieving this end
becomes largely an empirical problem. However, we still have to
preserve a balance between the value of achieving it, and the
undesirable side-effects of the means we may have to adopt in
order to do so. We must not use a sledge-hammer to crack a nut.
What we are looking for are the administrative methods that
will control most effectively the various forms of second-order
sexual behaviour that we consider desirable to control on the
ground of their undue commercial exploitation of sex. The two
methods that immediately spring to mind are licensing and
taxation, or a combination of both. Licensing regulates directly
permissible second-order sexual behaviour; taxation regulates it
indirectly by making some forms of it more expensive than
others. Both involve the setting of standards that must be
attained if a license is to be granted, or if a certain rate of tax is
to be avoided. To construct a satisfactory model of methods of
controlling second-order sexual behaviour presupposes a grasp
of existing commercial practices, for their object is not to create
an ideal set of methods, but to control certain forms of existing
or anticipated commercial exploitation. Obviously, some
methods will be better for some forms of second-order sexual
behaviour than for others. Thus, licensing presumably will
continue to play a key role in the control of television, radio
and films. On the other hand, the usefulness of a special tax on
pornographic television and radio programmes is more problematical. Certainly, no system of monetary deterrents alone
will be sufficient to curb undue commercial exploitation of sex,
though I am not convinced that it has not an important part to
play. One of the most pernicious effects of this kind of
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exploitation is the deterioration and even the destruction of
whole neighbourhoods. The only way to deal with the evil of
pornographic urban blight is to restrict the number of outlets
and permissible displays. Control should not, however, be
limited to store fronts. The blight is spread by the lurid
packaging of the pornographic products into the very hearts of
bookstores, drugstores and supermarkets, exposing juveniles to
the bare flesh of what are now regarded as very innocuous
books and magazines. Perhaps the idea of plastic covers which
has already been utilized by the exploiters to prevent gratuitous
handling, could at least be extended for the benefit of
non-pornographic customers and juveniles.
I have submitted that the most appropriate and effective
way of controlling undue commercial exploitation of sex is to
strike at its roots through administrative means. I shall now
submit that the most appropriate and effective tribunals for
determining disputes about the existence of such exploitation,
or about the legal validity of any method of control, are
administrative tribunals specially set up for that purpose.
Appeal to the courts should be allowed in certain circumstances. It would be the function of such a tribunal, for
instance, to determine whether the reproduction for sale of
certain pictures should be considered as amounting to an undue
exploitation of sex. The issue would not be whether the
reproductions are in essence a work of art or pornography, but
whether or not they can be reasonably supposed to have been
made for the commercial exploitation of sex, and whether the
tribunal considers the degree of exploitation undue. Although
expert evidence should be permitted to support or rebut the
claim that the work possesses artistic merit, the finding that it
does or does not have such merit should be merely one factor in
the situation and not conclusive one way or the other. A
completely non-erotic work of art may by false advertising be
misused for undue commercial exploitation of sex; a work of
erotic art may be commercially reproduced for sale without
amounting to undue exploitation, and so may a work that is
entirely devoid of artistic merit, even though it is sexually
explicit, provided that its commercial appeal is relatively
insignificant.
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5. Public and Private Sexual Bebaviour
The approach to pornography in terms of undue commercial
exploitation cuts across the distinction between public and
private sexual behaviour; for second-order sexual behaviour in
private may amount to undue commercial exploitation of sex
(for instance, the taking of indecent photographs at home for
the purpose of sale), and second-order sexual behaviour in
public may not (for instance, the free distribution of
pornographic material with no strings attached). The objection
to the second-order sexual behaviour is often simply put on the
ground of its public aspect, but this in itself is clearly not a
sufficient ground for controlling it. The plausibility of the
objection rests on the hidden premise that such behaviour
shocks the sensibilities of the public. Yet if is difficult to see
why the mere fact that certain second-order sexual behaviour
shocks the sensibilities of the public should amount to a
sufficient reason for controlling it. After all, some sensibilities
are notoriously easily shocked, and it is often necessary to
shock people if you want to change them. The argument from
shock to public sensibilities, I submit, only holds if the shock is
justified. The counter-argument that in a democracy values can
be reduced to numbers, since the values of the majority must
prevail, is not, in my view, valid. Although values are incurably
subjective, they must be capable of justification according to
certain evaluative standards if they are to be rationally
defensible. These standards must have a certain ideological
content, and not merely a certain numerical support. For
instance, to prohibit the exhibition of a nude statue by
Michelangelo on the ground that it shocks the sensibilities of
the public is not, I suggest, a sufficient reason for banning it.
(However, the probability that this would lead to a breach of
the peace might be.) To base a value system simply on the
registration of shock is to debase the very notion of a value
system. This is not to deny that in a democracy the majority
enjoys, theoretically, decisive political power, and that it
therefore constitutes an important political factor in deciding
what kind of social practices to control.
Shock to the sensibilities of the public then is not a
sufficient reason for controlling second-order sexual behaviour;
and, conversely, the private nature of such behaviour is not a
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sufficient reason for not controlling it. Hence the case for
controlling second-order sexual behaviour if, and only if such
behaviour is public, falls to the ground. This case must not be
confused with the very different case put forward by Mill,8
namely that legal and moral intervention is not justified in
regard to any behaviour that is purely self-regarding. The
distinction between private and public acts is not the same as
that between self-regarding and other-regarding acts. The former
refers to the private or public setting of acts; the latter refers to
the kind of harm done by the acts. The rationale of the former,
as we have just seen, is shock to public sensibilities; the
rationale of the latter is that each person, once he has reached
maturity of judgment, is the best judges of his own good, and
that social intervention should be limited to acts which are
harmful to others and to society.
The validity of the distinction between self-regarding and
other-regarding acts was challenged by Stephen 9 and Devlin.'o
They maintain that no act is purely self-regarding, and that the
distinction therefore is false. I have suggested that it has been
misconceived:
"The distinction between self-regarding and otherregarding acts is ... a normative and not a factual

distinction. The question is where we ougbt to draw
the distinction, not where it is, and how we answer it
will depend not only on our values, but also on the
purpose for which the question is asked. Thus, all
other things being equal, we will be more reluctant to
classify an act as other-regarding for the purpose of
imposing a legal sanction than for the purpose of
imposing a moral sanction." 1
We may find it fruitful to pose the question of whether we
ought to control first and second-order sexual behaviour in
terms of whether we ought to regard such behaviour as
self-regarding or as other-regarding. However, to pose the
question in this way does not give us an answer to it
independently of our own evaluative standards. Certainly, the
8. See J. S. Mill, On Liberty (1859).
9. See J.F. Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity(1873).
10. See P. Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (1959).
11. Samek, supra, n. 4, at p. 195
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public nature of the second-order sexual behaviour does not
mean that it is other-regarding; an act done in public may not
significantly affect the public, and conversely an act done in
private may significantly affect the public.
The labelling of pornography as a "victimless" crime begs
the question of whether it ought to be regarded as a
self-regarding or as an other-regarding act. We can argue the case
either way. The sale of a pornographic article to a customer
may be regarded as a victimless crime because the customer
willingly buys the article and derives pleasure from it, or he may
be regarded as a victim who is being exploited by the seller.
Similarly, society may be regarded as unaffected by the
transaction, or as the ultimate victim; and the person whose
body is treated as a sex object may be regarded as a volunteer
who is handsomely paid for his services, or as the victim of the
pornographer. I submit that where the second-order sexual
behaviour amounts to undue commercial exploitation of sex,
both the consumer and the person whose sex is being exploited,
and the society to whom they belong, are all the victims of the
exploitation.
6. Conclusion
My submission on the whole has taken a different line of
approach from the Study Paper. While the thrust of the Study
Paper is in favour of relaxing the existing controls on
pornography as part of a general withdrawal of criminal law
from the protection of private morals, the burden of my
proposed submission has been that it should be controlled by
administrative means on the basis of the new guiding concept of
undue commercial exploitation of sex.
The concluding remarks of the Study Paper are prefaced
by the following quotation from Alice B. Toklas, What is
Remembered.
"By this time Gertrude Stein was in a sad state of
indecision and worry. I sat next to her and she said to
me early in the afternoon, What is the answer? I was
silent. In that case, she said, What is the question?"'2

12. Study Paper, at. p. 116.
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Gertrude Stein's remark is illuminating, not only for
pornography, but in a much more general way. The inability to
answer a question should alert us to the possibility that there is
something wrong with the question. This was the basis of
Wittgenstein's later approach to philosophy. 1 3 Traditionally,
philosophers had directed their attention to the answers given in
reply to philosophical questions. They seemed to have been
unaware that the form of the question itself might conceal an
error. The new line of approach was concerned with getting to
the root of the entanglement which led to the asking of the
4
wrong kind of question, and laying it to rest so to speak.1
This therapeutic approach to philosophy is, I submit, very
fruitful for the subject under discussion. What has confused us
in the past is not that a false answer has been given to the
question "What is (the essence of) pornography?" What has
confused us is that this type of question should have been asked
at all. Once we recognize that we must formulate the
question in clearer terms, that we must construct an answer to
it, and not expect to find it revealed as a self-evident truth when
we grasp the essence of the question, we will stop tilting at
windmills and grapple with the real problems.
I have submitted that the ultimate subject-matter of law
reform is the human behaviour contained in a social practice,
and the ultimate reason for reforming the law is dissatisfaction
with such behaviour. Hence, reforming the law of pornography
involves spelling out the kind of behaviour that should be
controlled. I have proposed a distinction between first-order
and second-order sexual behaviour, and limited myself to
second-order sexual behaviour that can be described as
pornographic. My reason for singling out this kind of behaviour
is the view that socially it is the most objectionable, since it
lends itself easily to mechanical presentation and therefore is
ideally suited to commercial exploitation.
Perhaps I should now, at this late stage, meet an argument
which might be considered fatal to my case. The argument

13. See
Anscombe,
14. See
Macmillan,

L. Wittgenstein, Philosopbical Investigations, transl. G.E.M.
2nd. ed., Oxford, Blackwell, 1958.
F. Waismann, The Principlesof Linguistic Pbilosophy, London,
1965, at pp. 3-4.
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would go something like this: "You have based your case for
the control of pornography on the ground of undue exploitation of sex, and you have been at pains to distinguish control of
second-order sexual behaviour by administrative means on this
ground from control of such behaviour by the criminal law on
the ground of the immorality of some forms of first-order
sexual behaviour. On the other hand, you have admitted that
our attitude to first-order sexual behaviour is likely to remain a
'hidden' moral factor in our attitude to second-order sexual
behaviour. You have given us no reason for striking at what you
call undue commercial exploitation of sex. It is not enough to
say that it is undesirable. Even subjective evaluative standards
must, on your own admission, be justified. The only ground on
which you can justify striking at undue commercial exploitation
of sex is on moral grounds. Hence we are back where we started
from. Pornography is undesirable and should be controlled
because it is immoral."
This argument, I suggest, is not valid. The case against
undue commercial exploitation can be made on a number of
grounds, from different points of view, and not merely on the
ground of its immorality, from the moral point of view. I am
happy to admit, however, that ultimately it rests on a moral
premise. Undue commercial exploitation could still be undesirable even if man were not regarded as autonomous; but what
makes it ultimately so objectionable is that it debases a free
subject into a consumer object. This is not the place to expound
my conception of the moral point of view, and 1 mention it
only by way of defence to meet an argument which might be
raised against me. Although I have treated pornography in this
submission as a social evil, I would not wish to deny its moral
roots. We must be careful, however, to distinguish the
immorality of undue commercial exploitation of second-order
sexual behaviour from the immorality of first-order sexual
behaviour. Even if we admit that our attitude to the latter is
likely to remain a hidden factor in our attitude to the former,
the immorality of the former is not reducible to that of the
latter. Undue commercial exploitation is immoral as such; it
need not be connected with sex, and when it is so connected, it
is the commercial exploitation of this connection, and not its
sexual nature, that makes it objectionable.
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No doubt we should have resisted earlier, and more
strongly, the manipulation of our wants. Yet it is better to resist
late than never, and our failure to act sooner is not a good
reason for capitulating now to the undue commercial exploitation of sex. I am not saying that this is the greatest danger that
faces the human race, that there are not other and more
pressing concerns. Too many people have preached control of
second and first-order sexual behaviour as if it were an end in
itself. It is not sex that disfigures our capitalist society; it is our
capitalist society that disfigures sex. What we need are not
greater controls on sex, but greater controls on its exploitation.
Looked at in this light, the control of pornography is not a
distraction from attending to other and more serious social ills;
on the contrary, it sets a useful precedent for tackling many of
them at their source.
To those who believe in laissez faire, the free market
system generates its own antidotes against any excess. The
unsoundness of this doctrine should have been exposed for all
times by the great depression; in fact, even in this post
post-Keynesian era, the ritual appeal to free market forces
continues to be dinned into our ears. The law of supply and
demand is invoked as an explanation and a cure for every kind
of economic happening and malpractice. Increase the supply of
pornography beyond a certain point, the laissez faire argument
goes, and the law of diminishing returns will begin to operate. It
is true that even the demand for pornography has its limits, and
that eventually it will level off. There is no reason to believe,
however, that it will dry up, or that it can be contained within
tolerable limits. The waters of pornography run deep; for they
have been effectively linked to the well-spring of sex.

